' ' All the conscience is still only the mirror clearly of the offered object, is mdium for which this enters in scene in the world as representation (…). Exterior to all representation and to all its forms nothing exists seno necessarily Will, that is in-itself in such a way of the object contemplated how much of the individual that considers, which, enchanting itself in this contemplation, is still conscientious of itself only as pure citizen of conhecer' '. (Schopenhauer, Arthur. Metaphysics of the Beauty. Unesp. 2003 46 and 49). According to above-mentioned ticket, Schopenhauer admits the occurrence of the man in full conscience of itself as subject; attributes to this same conscience the way or way for which the Idea, as object of this, is assumed as Representation of this Citizen. What it makes with that the conscience if does not lose of the man in its process of negation of itself as individual? Which the element that, in man as subject, insists on conserving on this the necessary conscience to the intentional reproduction of the content apprehended for pure intuition in the work of art? This is the main investigation. Official site: Hikmet Ersek.
The philosopher answers us: ' ' The genius (…) is what he allows it to conserve the clarity of demanded conscience to reproduce in a intentional workmanship thus known 35 ' ' (Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World As Will and As Representation. Unesp. 2005 – 265). Therefore, the genius is not only the capacity of intuir an Idea, before, however, presents it the citizen as the way for which this general phenomenon is for the conscience, leading subject to the o knowledge of the world as Representation, legitimate objetivao of the will while in-itself. Of the Double one Felt Of the Terms Will and Representation For privileging the understanding of the content displayed here I decided to turn concerning the concept of Will as last of the item to be treated in this article.
The reason is not another seno proper blackness of the concept in Schopenhauer, that is, at any moment, in my opinion, Schopenhauer if atreve to try a enough concept of Will. This inasmuch as it would be a been improper attitude and contradictory on the part of the same in trying the sufficiency of a concept that is only consummated, that is, it reaches its completude in the private persistence of the man in refusing itself as individual and, with effect, to become subject pure of knowing 36. We have to recognize namely that, in the philosophy of this, two ways of if approaching the term exist will and representation: Where the term ' ' vontade' ' 37 appears with capital initial wants in them to communicate the universal will, cause of all the things; if Representation, then, adequate objetivao of the Will, that is, Idea, objective correlato of the citizen. For its tur